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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
ERIC HUGH HOGAN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v* 
MICHELLE WHITEHEAD HOGAN, 
Defendant/Appellee. Case No. 950808-CA 
ooOoo 
Defendant/Appellee submits the following as her brief in 
the above-entitled matter: 
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
Appellate jurisdiction arises pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(g) (1987, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the Court abuse its discretion in awarding 
primary physical custody of the minor children of the parties to 
the Defendant? 
2. Did the Court have jurisdiction to award custody of 
the children to the Defendant and make an award of alimony? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. CASES. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are determinative in this case; 
complete copies are in the addendum to this brief: 
1. U.C.A. §30-3-5 (equitable jurisdiction of the Court 
in divorce proceedings); and 
2. U.C.A. §30-3-10 (statutory criteria for custody). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Divorce on July 
8, 1994. (R. 1-3) 
2. Mr. Hogan obtained an ex parte Temporary Restraining 
Order on July 9, 1994. (R. 40-41). Ms. Hogan in turn filed a 
motion seeking temporary custody of the children, child support, 
and alimony. The issues were heard by Commissioner Judith Atherton 
on July 20, 1994, and taken under advisement. Commissioner 
Atherton issued her Minute Entry on July 28, 1994, dissolving the 
Temporary Restraining Order, granting the parties joint legal 
custody of the minor children, granting Mr. Hogan primary physical 
custody, and ordering Mr. Hogan to pay the marital debts and 
mortgage on the marital residence (in which Ms. Hogan resided) in 
lieu of alimony. (R. 78-80). 
3. The matter was pre-tried on April 4, 1995, by 
Commissioner Judith Atherton. The issues of custody and alimony 
were certified. (R. 161). 
4. The matter was pre-tried before Judge Young on May 
3, 1995. The issues as previously identified by Commissioner 
Atherton were set for trial (R. 166). 
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Court made i_^...^ .*+.*.* -*--;-..• * 
matter for f::i«. ,: ^positiors or Aucus* —~ : 'ncings . 1 i-irz 
.aw ana d " .^  rec ui ' x" • ^  w^-ro n ^ r ^ d * uly 
'• - enterea i*,s supp]t..:^: . • i 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
:
'^ •' 1 ! llcliel le and Eri c Hogan wer e ma o: :i ed : i i 3 I ill ;; 1! 2 , 
198 ire the* parents of three children, Shay la
 f born April 
1 I tl i (K.C.) born May ] 2, 1989 and Andrew born May 18, 
199 ..; -.; e 1 1 e i s a 1 s o t h e m o t h e i: o £ t h i: EI e • b c y s f i: ::> ii h e i: f :i r s t 
marriage f who reside with her. 
- ' ' 2 Pri or to the separat ion of the parties (which was 
accomplished bj I Ii: , Hogan :>b ta :i n :i n g .ai i a x p a z: te Temporary 
Restraining Order removing the children from the care of Michelle) 
in J\ il y of 1994, Mi chelle Hogan was, by the admissi on of Mr. Hogan 
a n d t h e m n t u a ] ] y a g i: e e d n p c i: I :: i i s t o d y e v a ] i i a t o i:
 t K :i lit P e t e r s o n, t h e 
primary caretaker of the children.. (R. 3] 9; R. 565) . 
3 After obtai n i ng the Temporary Restra i ning Order, Mr. 
H oq«111 m i , i V i;;"jd :i i i t• :: • 11 i = 1 i :: III• = • : f 1 :i ii s pa rent s w:i th the three younger 
children. 
4 Mr Hogan had obtained the e X" parte Temporary 
Restra :i i :i :ii ng 0r der based upon a 11 eqations that, at the time of the 
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signing of the Order, his wife had absconded with the children and 
he did not know where they were. In fact, Ms. Hogan had taken the 
children on a weekend trip prior to Mr. Hogan seeking the 
restraining order, she had returned with the children, and they 
were all residing together at the marital residence for four days 
prior to her being served with the Order summarily depriving her of 
the custody of her children. (R. 400-408). 
5. Commissioner Atherton subsequently found that there 
was no basis for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. 
Nevertheless, she granted the parties joint legal custody of the 
children, and designated Mr. Hogan as the primary physical 
custodian. (R. 78-80). 
6. The children resided with Mr. Hogan and his parents 
until the Court's decision in this matter, following trial. 
7. During the period of time the children resided with 
their father, his parents provided the primary care for them. (R. 
446; R. 578). 
8. During the time that this matter was pending, 
Michelle Hogan exercised consistently her visitation with the 
children. The children continued to identify her as their primary 
caretaker, and were found to be more closely bonded to her than to 
Mr. Hogan. (R. 592). 
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"•-.••..••'•••. • "I H i Hoqam appeared to be obsessed with his feelings 
that his wife was engaged in extramarital, relationships. There was 
no evidence oi a-< -xaal r e h f : ;r:ship, c* :er tha ^ allegation 
that . nance dt a Lj_iue * 1 *"% r^ 
the oldest o ^  . , , -. : .lt .^  , -^  ^ H anothpr i e 
several years . -r - , (; *-'-e presence of :er ounqest; oh. id, Anarew, 
ill IIni' ! iiii'ie Nevertheless, Mr, Hoqan 
admitted tiici; i »? : ~ -'js^^d the issue ol Mm, hello s boyfriends on 
a*- .eas*. l\_ L jcisi -ns w-r h Shayla during the period of separation. 
p d i soussed \ ;i. th her the fact that her 
mother ^^^ a • ^  . * .  , he divorce ot the parents ond \ u» is .I IM I a 
person because . * v ^  alleged relationships. if TR . 180-182), 
eterson, the mutually agreed upon custody 
evaluator , v__.^ , ^ ,- L^a , whilo both par L 11 s were oapdbJe p.u hiit s, 
the children *v«-: * re ^onded to *" -'• mother, she had been their 
p* * -= -^ . ^  * •—- -hildren w^i>° -^,r>p~.-t- w :*-*•• *-s Hogan, the 
children were bonded tu Linen oldei sibl iiiiq i, III . Hi n (iiiii li.nil i inqaqed 
in inappropriate conduct regarding his comments to the children, 
Ms. Hogan was capable of bei ng a very good parent, it was best to 
k e e p I: I: i e ::  1 i 1 1 d r e n t: o g e t: h e i: • i t: ; * a s b e s t f o i the y r 1i1 n q e s t child 
Andrew, to be raised by his mother , ther e wou Id nut bu an1, 111 u.li 11 
trauma to the children to return them to the care of their mother, 
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and it was appropriate for her to be the primary physical custodian 
of the children. (R. 601-606). 
11. Both Ms. Hogan and Mr. Peterson testified to the 
fact that she would encourage visitation with the children and 
their father, and that Mr. Hogan had been inflexible with regard to 
visitation. (R. 573; R. 692). 
12. At the initial hearing on Mr. Hogan's Order to Show 
Cause and Ms. Hogan's counter motions, the Court required Mr. Hogan 
to pay temporary alimony by way of making the mortgage payment on 
the marital residence and paying marital debt. The issue of 
alimony was certified by Commissioner Atherton as an issue in the 
case, and that matter was also presented before Judge Young. (R. 
78-80; 161). 
13. At the trial in the matter, counsel for Mr. Hogan 
admitted that he had not discovered, until his review of the file 
in preparation for the trial, that an Answer had not been filed. 
Judge Young granted counsel for Ms. Hogan leave to file an answer. 
An Answer was prepared, as is evidenced by the discussion among the 
Court and counsel referring to the denial of the allegations of Mr. 
Hogan that alimony was not appropriate, and mention of an 
affirmative allegation that alimony was indeed appropriate. It 
appears that the Answer, which was before the Court and counsel and 
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discussed ,»i I I: r i o I ultimately did not make its way into the Cour t 
file. {R, 236; U. 0/i) , . ' •'' • '• : ' •• ..." .- .'• ".••':. 
14, ,M I lie c o n c l u s i o n of a l l of t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h i s 
m a t t e r , and n f t e i ' in\ i n t e r i m p e r i o d of e x t e n d e d v i s i t a t i o n w i t h Ms. 
t h e C o u r t t u o k arid i 1 i.ona !l. L e s t i urn m^ in A I I I J I I ii I I  I I „ I " II"'H i m i n d 
made f i n a l f i n d i n g s and o r d e r s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e r e m a i n i n g i s s u e s , 
i r . - ' u d l n q p r i m a r y c u s t o d y , at t h a t l ime4 , J u d g e Young, i.n h i s 
f i n d i n g s annuui icc i l I MINI I In1 IMMH II, IMMIIII MM 1«»II 1 n\ ilnn/i* 
« 'I1'" m o t h e r s h o u l d bw g r a n t e d r e s i d e n t i a l 
cus tody of t h e ch i ] dren. \ 
.. • • • • I::: s t o t: h p a r e n t s e q ii a ] ] y 
;. .- _ ' c It i s important to the younger children " 
their older hal f siblings. 
I. Tl I = i In I ill i in n o b o n d e d t o e a c h p a r e n t . 
e . "The c h i l d r e n were t a k e n U u n Mic pj.ev lu l l s 
c u s t o d y , w h i c h r e a l l y was w i t h t h e m o t h e r , b a s e d on i m p r o p e r 
i 11) ") r in fi t i II in I I j i i" i in I I n « Court b ^ ' f ' r , H O q a n . 
f , 'l1 1U-J 11oniu w 11c n i Liu.1 IJ 11 i i d ie11 c wSJUPU p i 11.»i 
t h e i r r e m o v a l , w h e r e t h e mother c u r r e n t l y l e s i d e s , p r o v i d e s b e t t e r 
act :ommodat i' nw f OI t h e ch i l d r e n . 
g , w h i l e ii11II J ai n o iihio denn ins»»Lrc11" oil more 
c h a r a c t e r i n s t a b i : i t y , b o t h p a r e n t s a r e v e r y s t r o n g i n t h e i r d e s i r e 
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for custody, and the mother has been more bonded over the life of 
the children with the children than the father, 
h. There has been no previously relinquishment of 
custody. 
i. Religious compatibility with the children is 
basically comparable. 
j. The financial circumstances would weigh in 
favor of the father. However, the home environment in which he is 
currently residing has resulted in him delegating much of the 
responsibility of the care for the children to his mother. 
k. The children, residing with their mother, will 
be in the home they know and in the neighborhood know, and in the 
relationships they know. 
1. There is a stronger willingness on the part of 
the mother to see that visitation continues with the other parent. 
There is no evidence that the mother has criticize the father, but, 
to the contrary, the mother has endeavored to see that the children 
have a continuing good relationship with their father. (R. 900-
904) . 
These findings were incorporated into the Court's 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Order. 
15. The Court granted the Defendant alimony of $500 per 
month. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A trial court is invested with broad discretion in 
awarding custody of children. The Court's determination is to be 
upheld in the absence of a showing that the decision was clearly 
erroneous and an abuse of discretion. The Findings of the Court 
(the sufficiency of which have not been challenged by the 
Appellant) are supported by substantial evidence. The Appellant's 
marshalling of the evidence clearly demonstrates that the Court's 
decision was proper. 
The trial court, by statute, has the equitable power to 
include in a divorce decree orders relating to custody, property, 
and support. Those issues were properly addressed by the Court in 
its decision. In any event, an answer was delivered to the Court, 
pursuant to Court permission, during the proceedings. Throughout 
the proceedings, Appellant was well aware of the Defendant's claim 
for custody and alimony, and the failure to file an Answer prior to 
the trial did not result in any prejudice to the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff's appeal is frivolous, and this Court 
should award all attorney's fees and costs incurred by the Appellee 
in defending the same. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN GRANTING DEFENDANT PHYSICAL 
CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The trial court judge has broad discretion in making 
custody determinations. It is the trial judge who is in the best 
position to hear the testimony and observe the demeanor and 
credibility of witnesses. If the trial judge weighs carefully all 
the evidence presented and rules within established legal 
guidelines, then this Appellate Court may not reverse the custody 
award of the trial court. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988), 
Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah App. 1992). "Only 
where the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be 
an abuse of discretion, will [Appellate Court}] interpose its own 
judgment". Shioii v. Shioii, 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985). 
Appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of the 
Findings of Fact entered by the Court below. The Findings may not 
be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Marchant v. 
Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). 
B. Legal Standards in Custody Determinations. 
A Utah court determining custody must begin with U.C.A. 
§30-3-10 (1989), and consider the best interests of the child. 
Case law has given substance to this standard and has established 
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factors for a Court to consider in the application of this test 
such as: the need for stability and custodial relationships and 
environment; maintaining and existing primary custodial bond; the 
relative strength of parent bonds, relative abilities of the 
parents to provide care, supervision, and a suitable environment 
for the child and to meet the needs of the children; preference of 
a child able to evaluate the custody question; continuing sibling 
bonds; the moral character and emotional stability of the custodial 
parent and the desire for custody; the apparent commitment of the 
proposed custodian to parenting. Moon v, Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah 
App., 1990)(citing factors established in Schindler v. Schindler, 
776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). 
C. Appellant Failed to Marshall all of the Evidence in Favor of 
the Court's Finding, 
Mr. Hogan marshalled a good deal of evidence in support 
of the Court's finding awarding physical custody of the children to 
Michelle Hogan. In his brief, he pointed out that Mr. Hogan 
acknowledged that his wife had never left the children with an 
inappropriate supervisor, that her father characterized her as a 
caring, loving mother, that Shayla's school teacher thought her to 
be an appropriate parent with a warm, nurturing relationship with 
her daughter, that three of her friends testified that she was an 
excellent parent, that Kim Peterson, who performed the custody 
evaluation, determined that she had been the primary caretaker of 
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the children, that she was an adequate parent who would take care 
of their needs, be nurturing, and give them sufficient attention 
and parenting, that the children have a very positive relationship 
with their mother, and she was in a better position to have primary 
custody of them. 
However, Mr. Hogan failed to mention other substantial 
evidence that supported the Court's finding. For instance, Mr. 
Hogan ignores his own testimony in which he acknowledged that 
Michelle was the primary caretaker of the children, and was 
perfectly capable of taking care of the children, and that it was 
their agreement that she stay home to be a full-time mother. (R. 
319-320). Similarly, Mr. Hogan fails to note that he had spoken 
with his daughter Shayla about Michelle's "boyfriends" at least 20 
times, told his young daughter that he did not trust Michelle, and 
that Michelle had broken promises. Mr. Hogan maintained that those 
conversations with Shayla were appropriate. (R. 180-182). The 
propriety of those kinds of conversations was of great concern to 
Nina Parker-Cohen, a psychologist who testified on Mr. Hogan's 
behalf. (R. 375-378). Dr. Parker-Cohen testified that this kind 
of behavior on the part of Mr. Hogan could indicate that he was 
using the child to validate his own perspective, and that it was a 
form of manipulation. (R. 376). 
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Kim Peterson, the custody evaluator, was similarly 
concerned about Mr. Hogan's behavior. He testified that Mr. 
Hogan's conduct could place Shayla at risk for the development of 
emotional and behavioral difficulties, and that it was potentially 
a serious problem. (R. 591). 
Mr. Peterson also testified that the child Keith (known 
as K.C.) was more bonded to Michelle than to Eric, that he was 
happier with his mother (R. 577-578), and that at the time of 
separation Andrew, the youngest child, was more bonded to Michelle 
than to Eric. (R. 360-361). Mr. Peterson also relayed the opinion 
of Michelle's therapist that she had good capacity to parent (R. 
599). Mr. Hogan also fails to note that Mr. Peterson testified 
that, given Andrew's age, it was best for him to be raised 
primarily by his mother, and that it would be best to keep the 
three younger children together with their older siblings. (R. 
603-604) . 
Finally, although Mr. Hogan does cite the testimony of 
Michelle regarding her problems with visitation and Mr. Hogan's 
rigidity in terms of rearranging schedule, he ignores her testimony 
regarding her willingness to allow Eric additional visitation when 
the children were in her physical custody. She also testified that 
she had unsuccessfully encouraged his parents to visit with the 
children after they were returned back to her home, and was 
13 
concerned about the effects of the transition on them. (R. 853-
855) . 
Other than his statement that the evidence does not 
support Judge Young's findings, the Appellant has utterly failed to 
demonstrate how those findings were clearly erroneous and not 
supported by the evidence. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO 
ENTER AN ORDER AWARDING PHYSICAL CUSTODY TO 
THE DEFENDANT, AND AWARDING ALIMONY TO HER. 
It is not disputed that, on the first day of trial, it 
was discovered that inadvertently no Answer had ever been filed to 
the Complaint. An Answer was subsequently prepared on July 7, 
1995, which contained affirmative allegations that the Defendant 
should be awarded the custody of the minor children, and should be 
awarded alimony. (A copy of the Answer is included in the 
Addendum). It is not known to counsel for the Defendant why the 
Answer is not included in the official court file, as it was 
presented in Court on the third day of trial. Clearly, the Answer 
was received by Mr. Hogan's counsel, as he referred to it at trial. 
(R. 703). Further, as Judge Young noted, the issues being tried, 
including alimony, could not have come as a surprise to Mr. Hogan. 
(R. 705). In fact, at the pre-trial settlement conference in front 
of Commissioner Atherton, the issues of custody and alimony were 
certified. (R. 161). Further, Mr. Hogan had been paying the 
14 
mortgage payment in lieu of temporary alimony during the pendency 
of the proceedings. 
Even in the absence of an Answer, by statute the Court 
has equitable jurisdiction to enter orders providing for custody of 
the children and alimony. U.C.A. §30-3-5. In fact, even if a 
party's default has been entered by the Court (which certainly was 
not the case at bar) , the Court must conduct an inquiry into 
whether the Petitioner is entitled to the relief requested. Judge 
Young made such an inquiry with regard to the issues of custody and 
alimony, and his judgments regarding those issues must be upheld. 
It should also be noted that the Appellant has not challenged the 
merits of the alimony award, and there is no reason to disturb it 
on appeal. 
POINT III. THE APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS 
FRIVOLOUS, AND THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED 
HER ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN 
DEFENDING IT. 
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that 
the Court may award attorney's fees and costs to a party who is 
forced to defend against a frivolous appeal. Defendant 
respectfully submits that the essential basis of Mr. Hogan's appeal 
is not that Judge Young's decisions were legally infirm, but simply 
that Mr. Hogan did not agree with the result. He does not even 
attempt to assail the evidence that Ms. Hogan was the primary 
caretaker of the children, by all accounts is a competent caretaker 
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of the children, and the children are bonded to her, that she would 
facilitate visitation, that it would be best for all six of her 
children to live together, and that Mr. Hogan's own conduct 
regarding the children was frequently inappropriate. His 
disappointment in the judge's decision is understandable, but his 
insistence on appealing an obviously legally valid decision has 
resulted in a substantial financial burden to the Defendant, which 
she can ill afford. It is appropriate for this Court to award her 
all costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending this action. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant/Appellee 
respectfully submits that the judgment of the trial below should be 
affirmed, and that she should be awarded her attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in this proceeding. 
DATED this ^ day of September, 1996. 
_M 
ANN L. WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing, BRIEF OF APPELLEE, this ^f day 
of September, 1996, to: 
Mr. Martin N. Olsen 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
8138 South State 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
ANN L. WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Code Annotated 
2. Utah Code Annotated 
3. Utah Code Annotated 
4. Rule 33, Utah Rules 
5. Defendant's Answer 
§30-3-5 
§30-3-10 
§78-2a-3(2)(g) 
of Appellate Procedure 
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ADDENDUM - 1 
30-3-4 HUSBAND AND WIFE 84 
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affidavit 
— Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise 
except upon legal evidence taken in the cause. If the decree is to be entered 
upon the default of the defendant, evidence to support the decree may be 
submitted upon the affidavit of the plaintiff with the approval of the court. 
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a child or children and the 
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section 
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be administered, a decree of divorce 
may not be granted until both parties have attended a mandatory course 
provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and have presented a certificate of course 
completion to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own 
motion or on the motion of one of the parties, if it determines course 
attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or 
the court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall 
enter the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree after default 
of the defendant, upon the plaintiffs affidavit. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court 
upon the motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of 
record or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of 
Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving 
public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. This sealing 
does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1211; L. Amendment Notes. — The 1995 aroend-
1909, ch. 60, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 2999; R.S. 1933 ment, effective July 1, 1995, added the second 
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, sentence of Subsection (lXb) and in the second 
ch. 59, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116, sentence of Subsection (l)(d) substituted "shall 
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, § 1; 1989, ch. 104, § 1; enter the decree" for "shall make and file find-
1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 35; 1992, ch. ings and decree" and added the language begin-
98, § 1; 1992, ch. 290, § 3; 1995, ch. 62, § 1. ning "or, in the case of" at the end. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
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(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties, separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order 
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing 
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of 
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the 
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Parts 4 and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
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(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal-
ize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse 
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and foxind to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
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History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. 
1909, ch. 109, § 4; CX. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1; 
1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993, 
ch. 261, § 1; 1994, ch. 284, § 1; 1995, ch. 330, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1,1995, deleted a provision 
from Subsection (3) for support and mainte-
nance orders; deleted former Subsections (5) 
and (6), providing that alimony terminates 
Section 
30-6-1. Definitions. 
30-6-2. Abuse or danger of abuse — Pro-
tective orders. 
30-6-3. Venue of action. 
30-6-4. Forms for petitions and protective 
orders — Assistance. 
30-6-4.1. Continuing duty to inform court of 
other proceedings — Effect of 
other proceedings. 
30-6-4.2. Protective orders — Ex parte pro-
tective orders — Modification of 
orders — Duties of the court. 
30-6-4.3. Hearings on ex parte orders. 
30-6-4.4. No denial of relief solely because 
of lapse of time. 
upon remarriage, or cohabitation with a mem-
ber of the opposite sex, by the payee; added 
Subsections (7) to (9); renumbered former Sub-
sections (7) and (8) as (5) and (6); and made 
stylistic changes. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 330, 
which amended this section, provides in § 2 
that the Legislature does not intend that ter-
mination of alimony based on cohabitation, in 
accordance with Subsection (9), "be interpreted 
in any way to condone such a relationship for 
any purpose." 
Section 
30-6-4.5. Mutual protective orders prohib-
ited. 
30-6-4.6. Prohibition of court-ordered or 
court-referred mediation. 
30-6-4.8. Electronic monitoring of domestic 
violence offenders. 
30-6-5 to 30-6-7. Repealed. 
30-6-8. Statewide domestic violence net-
work — Peace officers' duties — 
Prevention of abuse in absence 
of order — Limitation of liabil-
ity. 
30-6-9, 30-6-10. Repealed. 
30-6-11. Division of Family Services — De-
velopment and assistance of vol-
unteer network. 
CHAPTER 5 
GRANDPARENTS 
Section 
30-5-2. Visitation rights of grandparents. 
30-5-2. Visitation rights of grandparents. 
(1) The district court may grant grandparents reasonable rights of visita-
tion, if it is in the best interest of the grandchildren, in cases where a 
grandparent's child has died or has become a noncustodial parent through 
divorce or legal separation. 
(2) Grandparents may petition the court as provided in Section 78-32-12.2 
to remedy a parent's wrongful noncompliance with a visitation order. 
History: C. 1953, 30-5-2, enacted by L. immediate family members" from both subsec-
1977, ch. 123, § 2; 1993, ch. 152, § 2; 1995, tions and in Subsection (1) substituted "grand-
ch. 257, § 1. children" for "children" and added the clause 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- beginning "in cases" to the end. 
ment, effective May 1,1995, deleted "and other 
CHAPTER 6 
COHABITANT ABUSE ACT 
ADDENDUM - 2 
30-3-9 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
Utah Cahoon v Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224,342 P 2d dated poor to the second marriage, the second 
94 (1959) marriage was valid Cahoon v Pelton, 9 Utah 
Where a wife obtained an interlocutory di- 2d 224, 342 P2d 94 (1959) 
vorce decree m California and, subsequent to 
the expiration of one year therefrom, married a Cited m Van Der Stappen v Van Der 
second husband and later applied for and re- Stappen, 815 P2d 1335 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
ceived a nunc pro tunc final divorce judgment 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 24 Am. Jur 2d Divorce and C.J.S. — 27C C J S Divorce § 764 
Separation § 432 Key Numbers. — Divorce «=» 320 
30-3-9. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 30-3-9 (R S 1898 & C L marital rights by the guilty party in a divorce 
1907, § 1213, C L 1917, § 3005; R S. 1933 & proceeding, was repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 72, 
C 1943, 40-3-9), relatmg to the forfeiture of § 26 
30-3-10. Custody of children in ease of separation or 
divorce — Custody consideration. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their 
marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the 
future care and custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate. In 
determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The 
court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's 
desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are not 
controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the 
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of 
the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with 
the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the child, or 
has attempted to permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall take 
that evidence into consideration in determining whether to award custody to 
the other parent. 
History: L. 1903, ch. 82, § 1; C.L. 1907, Cross-References. — Disposition of prop-
§ 1212x; C.L. 1917, § 3004; R.S. 1933 & C. erty and children, § 30-3-5 
1943, 40-3-10; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 7; 1977, ch. Removal of children from homestead, § 30-2-
122, § 5; 1988, ch. 106, § 1; 1993, ch. 131, § 1. io 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, added Subsection 
(3) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Children's choice 
A . Custody evaluation reports 
A j E L n of secuon F a c t o r s " detannuung best mterests of ch.ld 
Award proper — Improper factors 
Change of custody —Moral character 
— Burden of proof —Sexual abuse 
480 
ADDENDUM - 3 
78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
tion, because jurisdiction attached under the Certiorari. 
statute in effect when the petition for review When exercising certiorari jurisdiction 
was filed. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n granted by this section, the Supreme Court 
v. Board of State Lands, 869 R2d 909 (Utah reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
1^93).
 n o t of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the 
-Formal adjudicative proceedings. P?* i e s should address the decision of the Court 
Subdivision (SXeXui) confers jurisdiction in ° f f fP? a s; n<* t h* d e « f ° n ° f ***** » £ * • 
the Supreme Court only over final orders and Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
decrees that originate in formal adjudicative
 c i t e d i n S t a t e v Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 
proceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah (Tjtah 1991) 
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992). 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board 
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
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(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 13, § 45. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsections 
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through 
(k). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2)(h) and 
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in 
Subsection (4). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Scope. 
Cited. 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Appeal from the dismissal of a habeas corpus 
petition, in which defendant claimed only that 
his due process rights were violated at a hear-
ing before the parole board, lay to the Court of 
Appeals rather than the Supreme Court; the 
latter has jurisdiction only over direct appeals 
of first degree or capital felony convictions and 
appeals in habeas corpus cases where the con-
viction or sentence is challenged. Padilla v. 
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 1991). 
Scope. 
This statute does not authorize the Court of 
Appeals to review the orders of every adminis-
trative agency, but allows judicial review of 
agency decisions "when the legislature ex-
pressly authorizes a right of review." Barney v. 
Division of Occupational and Professional Li-
censing, 828 P2d 542 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 843 P2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
Cited in State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 
(Utah 1991) 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-4 
78-3-11.5. 
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases 
to circuit court — Appeals — 
Jurisdiction when circuit and 
district court merged. 
State District Court Adminis-
trative System 
Section 
78-3-16.5 
78-3-21. 
78-3-21.5. 
Repealed. 
Judicial Council — Creation — 
Members — Terms and elec-
tion — Responsibilities — Re-
ports. 
Data bases for judicial boards 
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ADDENDUM - 4 
{01 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 33 
Hule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
light in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
jafcen under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
jiamages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
Wjat the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
rief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
iing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
rse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
i purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
ass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
efit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
ihe appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
ghall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
tause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause 
thall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
Wmit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
{8) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
'Wort shall grant a hearing. 
Committee Note. — Rule 33 is 
redrafted to provide definitions 
is for assessing penalties for de-
frivolous appeals. 
£*PP**1 is found to be frivolous, the court 
damages. This is in keeping with 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
amount of damages — single or 
or attorney fees or both — is left to 
of the court. Rule 33 is amended 
•PWtt the authority of the court to 
impose sanctions upon the party or upon coun-
sel for the party. This rule does not apply to a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid 
the conflict created for appointed counsel by 
Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) and 
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
Under the law of these cases, appointed coun-
sel must file an appeal and brief if requested by 
the defendant, and the court must find the ap-
peal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the ap-
peal. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
f? ftPPeal from a judgment relat-
j jTj ™ distribution of marital 
gjmolous, where there was no ba-
|2y™«at presented and the evi-
•"^aiflcharacterized and mis-
' ,
 Laxne
«» 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 
Vb^ ^ k k d rule and was 
Vj^action when, after he in-
t»Ll J malPr*ctice action 
•E^°t0 n t i 8 t and found that 
"*** of duty or causation, 
the record was devoid of any relevant, admissi-
ble evidence showing negligence, and after los-
ing on summary judgment, he persisted in fil-
ing an appeal. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 
(Utah 1990). 
An appeal brought from an action that was 
properly determined to be in bad faith is neces-
sarily frivolous under this rule. Utah Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
Attorney who, after a case had been fully 
adjudicated, chose to ignore the decision and 
attempted to relitigate the same case violated 
Subdivision (a) of this rule and was therefore 
subject to sanctions. Schoney v. Memorial Es-
tates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
—Defined. 
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal 
ADDENDUM - 5 
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 
Attorney for Defendant 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ERIC HUGH HOGAN, : 
: ANSWER 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
MICHELLE WHITEHEAD HOGAN, : 
Defendant. : Case No. 944902846 DA 
: Judge David S. Young 
ooOoo 
Michelle W. Hogan, Defendant herein, hereby answers the 
Complaint of Plaintiff, and in response to the numbered allegations 
of the Complaint, admits, denies or otherwise responds as follows: 
1. Admitted. 
2• Admitted. 
3. Admitted. 
4. Denied. Defendant affirmatively alleges that she is 
a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody and control 
of the parties' minor children subject to the Plaintiff's 
reasonable rights of visitation. 
1 
5. Denied. Defendant affirmatively asserts that she 
should be awarded child support in an amount consistent with the 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines. The Defendant should be entitled 
to an Order of mandatory income withholding as provided for §62A-
11-501, et. seqf Utah Code Annotated. 
6. Denied. 
7. Denied. 
8. Admitted. 
9. Admitted. 
10. Admitted. 
11. Denied. Defendant affirmatively asserts that the 
Plaintiff should be responsible to pay her attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully submits that the Court 
should enter such orders as are consistent with her responses as 
set forth above. 
DATED this / day of July, 1995. 
m L. WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Defendant 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be 
correct copy of the foregoing, ANSWER, this 
1995, to: 
Mr. Randy S. Ludlow, Esq. 
311 South State, #280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
a7\17850.ans 
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